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‘NEUROPHOBIA’, a Reply to Patterson
Peter A. Alces
The College of William & Mary School of Law, Williamsburg, VA 23185, USA
Corresponding author. E-mail: paalce@wm.edu

Space limitations preclude my addressing all of Professor Patterson’s misunderstanding, so I shall focus on the more troublesome instances:
Patterson dismisses my book (‘Moral Conflict,’ textual page references herein are
to the book) in terms borrowed from McGinn’s review of Changeux, concluding, with
McGinn, that arguments promoting the neuroscientific perspective must be metaphysical. Applied to ‘Moral Conflict’, Patterson’s central assertion is wrong, on at least three
levels: first, McGinn was responding to Changeux’s supposed reliance on neuroscience
to inform critique of dualism and the establishment of materialism insofar as the metaphysical nature of ‘the good, the true, and the beautiful’ is concerned. ‘Moral Conflict’
is not concerned with the nature of such experiences; it is concerned with how the
law takes account of brain states, a different matter altogether. We might be able to
‘see’ knowledge or even recklessness on an fMRI scan1 ; I make no argument about
whether we will ever capture the experience of knowledge or recklessness in terms of
brain state. Patterson here falls victim to the very Act/Object fallacy he accuses me
of running ‘up against’ when he fails to see that McGinn’s critique of Changeux was
based on McGinn’s writing about ‘the activity of thinking’; I and the law care only about
‘what one thinks’. Next, though my argument need not be metaphysical, it actually is,
at least according to Bennett and Hacker, whose ‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ provided the template for Patterson and Pardo’s ‘Minds, Brains, and Law’. My
book follows the metaphysical eliminative materialism Bennett and Hacker attribute to
Paul Churchland (at 70–73). Finally, asserting that promotion of neuroscience requires
engagement with philosophy is akin to asserting that natural selection must account for
theology.
1

Iris Vilares et al., Predicting the Knowledge-Recklessness Distinction in the Human Brain,
www.pnas./org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1619385114 (accessed May 30, 2018); perhaps Patterson foreshadowed that development in reply to an earlier work critical of his perspective, when he acknowledged that
he and Pardo ‘do not take issue with the possibility that advances in empirical knowledge may cause us to
revise our concepts’. Dennis Patterson, Symposium on Minds, Brains, and Law: A Reply, 7 JURISPRUDENCE 181,
181–91 (2016). Apparently the Vilares et al.’s article did not occasion such revision.
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Law, Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that
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Patterson observes that there exist ‘things in the world that are not material’. But
materialism can understand those ‘things’ as manifestations of the material. The ability to do mathematics is a manifestation of brain. The fact that mathematical truths are
not dependent on neural function is no more significantly true than is the fact that the
reflection of light waves is not dependent on the eye.
Patterson misunderstands (or misreads) my invocation of Raine’s important work
on the biological roots of crime. I do not assert Raine is a determinist (though he may
be) and then cite his position to establish the truth of determinism. My citation of
Raine’s work supports the conclusion that ‘we are the product of forces that act on
us—and only the product, not the producer of such forces’ (at 36). Raine read the draft
of the chapter that cites him at length and then read the entire book before he wrote
one of the promotional blurbs that appear on the back cover. He likely would not have
ignored misrepresentation of his conclusions.
Patterson’s positing Raine as an example of someone whose brain scan shares characteristics of psychopathy betrays Patterson’s confusion of the empirical and the conceptual.2 No one, and certainly not I, has ever concluded that we can now determine
from a brain scan without more whether someone is, in fact, a psychopath. Empirically
we cannot know, yet; there is no conceptual barrier to our eventually overcoming that
empirical limitation. ‘Moral Conflict’ is considerate throughout of the current empirical
limitations.
Patterson denies he is a dualist. Others too have reached the conclusion that Patterson’s views are dualistic.3 Patterson clarifies that he and Pardo conclude in ‘Minds,
Brains, and Law’ that the mind is ‘an array of capacities’. I see no difference between that
phrasing and my characterization of their dualism as based on ‘properties’. My characterization just makes their property dualism more transparent.
Patterson turns to my discussion of tort theory and concludes that ‘[w]hat is badly
needed is a demonstration of how the neuroscientific conception of agency can both
displace and replace our current regime of tort law’. Here, again, Patterson fails to read
carefully. When he lists the tort theorists whose work I engage he omits reference to
my extended discussion of Hurd. There (at 167–76) I make clear the displacement and
replacement of the current tort regime, a regime based on the very ‘moral responsibility’
that neuroscientific insights undermine, in terms Hurd explains.4
I am not sure Patterson appreciates what it means to understand human agency in
mechanical terms: ‘Alces likens blaming humans for their actions to blaming a car for
not starting .... Humans, like the cars they drive, are purely mechanical devices that
occasionally require repair but benefit not at all from praise or blame.’ I never suggest
that human agents cannot benefit from praise or blame. In fact, the opposite is true.
2
3

4

This is an error Patterson makes often. See Dennis Patterson, Neuromania, 5 J. L. & BIOSCI. 27, 29 (2018).
See Neil Levy, Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused?, J. ETHICS 171, 174 (2014); Walter Glannon, Brain, Behavior, and Knowledge, 4 NEUROETHICS 194 (2011); MARTIN ROTH, 4–5 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROLAW 122, 184 (2018).
Here Patterson also criticizes my frequent use of the adjective ‘incoherent’ to describe disappointment with
applications of non-instrumental theory to legal doctrine. But he misunderstands: ‘incoherent’ is not an epithet;
to say that an argument is ‘incoherent’ is to say that the argument assumes characteristics of the subject that are
not present. Any normative theory based on the moral responsibility of human agents is incoherent because
human agents do not have moral responsibility, and it is Waller’s arguments ‘Against Moral Responsibility’ that
support my conclusion.
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Patterson’s confusion is a product of his conclusion that because humans respond to
reasons they are not mechanistic. Reasons are just another ‘cause’, empirically but not
conceptually different from other more obviously mechanical causes.
Patterson asserts my failure to cite neuroscientific research to bear on tort law doctrine and theory. Again, he may not have read the whole book carefully. I cite more than
150 neuroscientific studies pertinent to the book’s conclusions and note, at the outset,
that ‘[n]either each chapter nor any pair of chapters is a self-contained whole .... The
argument builds through the book to, ultimately, sustain the weight of the conclusion
that the premise that founds much if not all law—moral responsibility—is chimerical’
(at xiv). Another instance of Patterson’s misreading is his assertion that with regard to
both the tort and contract law I ‘ignore the implications of behavioral economics for
law’. But just three paragraphs earlier in his review he notes my citation of Daniel Kahneman, and ‘Moral Conflict’ as well cites and discusses the behavioral economics of
Kahneman, Bar-Gill, Hanson, Kysar, Ben-Shahar, Schneider, Marotta-Wurgler, Tversky, Yosifon, and others. Indeed, I cite the very book, by Bar-Gill, that Patterson criticizes me for not considering.
Ultimately it becomes clear that Patterson’s problem is neither with my particular
argument nor with the authorities I have collected nor even with how I have presented
them. He simply refuses to believe that neuroscience can tell us anything about
human agency so far as law is concerned. That is ‘neurophobia’. Patterson makes
the same argument in his book with Pardo, and critics have not been favorably
impressed. Faigman, in particular, responds convincingly to that argument.5 Faigman
discovers confusion of the conceptual and the empirical and that same confusion
persists in ‘Neuromania’. Faigman questions the contribution that philosophy could
make to the introduction of neuroscientific insights into legal analysis. In defense,
Pardo and Patterson reply to Faigman that ‘sure’, philosophy is not necessary to our
understanding of what constitutes, for example, ‘lying,’ ‘[b]ut we think it helps’.6 The
persistent problem for philosopher-neurophobes is that they cannot explain how their
philosophy ‘helps’; Faigman reveals how philosophy may hurt.
The law can steer through the straits of neuromania and neurophobia.7 We must
appreciate the limitations of the science as well as problematic doctrine and misplaced
enthusiasm for non-instrumental normative theory that is inconsiderate of the nature
of human agency neuroscientific insights can reveal.

5
6

7

David L. Faigman, Science and Law 101: Bringing Clarity to Pardo and Patterson’s Confused Conception of the
Conceptual Confusion of Law and Neuroscience, 7 JURISPRUDENCE 171, 171–80 (2016).
Patterson cites to his conclusion that philosophy provides the meaning of lying when he criticizes my suggesting
that neuroscience can, without help from philosophy, provide a concept of consent. And so he relies on the same
conceptual obfuscation that he was forced to abandon in his reply to Faigman.
Indeed, I believe the Supreme Court has demonstrated that. Patterson, following Morse, though, would argue
that the Court did not embrace neuroscience in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). We could quibble
about that, but it seems clear to me that Justice Kennedy, the author of Roper, thought neuroscience mattered
to that decision when he later concluded in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010), that since Roper ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds’ (Emphasis added).

